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Abstract
The contemporary legal landscape is one of a plurality of normative orders which exist 
alongside the conventional legal systems of states and public international law. That these 
systems interact and frequently conflict both with state law and international law and with 
each other is an increasingly common fact of modern legal practice. The concept of 
constitutionalism is frequently employed as a way of understanding these post-state regimes 
as well as a method of managing the inevitable conflicts between legal orders in a pluralist 
legal universe. In Europe, in particular, constitutionalism has featured prominently legal 
pluralist discourse in two important respects. Firstly, it has been employed as a way of 
theorizing non-state legal systems such as that of the European Union and the European 
Convention of Human Rights. Secondly, constitutionalism has been proposed as a frame 
within which to understand and manage legal pluralism in Europe and in particular as a 
framework for the resolution of conflicts between such orders. The the received wisdom in 
this literature is that pluralism and conflicts between EU and national law are amenable to 
resolution according to a robustly constitutionalist framework whereas ECHR conflicts with 
national law are of a more radical pluralist form, and therefore less ‘constitutionalist’. This 
paper challenges this orthodox position. It traces the genealogy of pluralism in the EU and 
ECHR orders, concluding that a pluralist conception of EU law cannot be constitutional due 
to the fact that conflicts between the EU and national law are contests of sovereignty, whose 
resolution in a constitutional frame is question-begging. The interaction between the ECHR 
and national legal systems, on the other hand, the paper argues, are precisely the sort of 
conflict where the concept of constitutionalism can do real work at the post-state level. In 
presenting this taxonomy as a better way of understanding normative pluralism in Europe, it 
concludes by introducing an argument against pluralism in the relationship between EU law 
and national law, arguing that the attitude of national courts such as the German 
Constitutional Court should be viewed as a form of institutional civil disobedience which is a 
normal aspect of any constitutional order, rather than requiring the positing of an overarching 
constitutional frame binding EU and national courts.
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Abstract
The contemporary legal landscape is one of a plurality of normative orders which 
exist alongside the conventional legal systems of states and public international law. 
That these systems interact and frequently conflict both with state law and 
international law and with each other is an increasingly common fact of modern legal 
practice. The concept of constitutionalism is frequently employed as a way of 
understanding these post-state regimes as well as a method of managing the 
inevitable conflicts between legal orders in a pluralist legal universe. In Europe, in 
particular, constitutionalism has featured prominently legal pluralist discourse in two 
important respects. Firstly, it has been employed as a way of theorising non-state 
legal systems such as that of the European Union and the European Convention of 
Human Rights. Secondly, constitutionalism has been proposed as a frame within 
which to understand and manage legal pluralism in Europe and in particular as a 
framework for the resolution of conflicts between such orders. The the received 
wisdom in this literature is that pluralism and conflicts between EU and national law 
are amenable to resolution according to a robustly constitutionalist framework 
whereas ECHR conflicts with national law are of a more radical pluralist form, and 
therefore less ‘constitutionalist’. This paper challenges this orthodox position. It 
traces the genealogy of pluralism in the EU and ECHR orders, concluding that a 
pluralist conception of EU law cannot be constitutional due to the fact that conflicts 
between the EU and national law are contests of sovereignty, whose resolution in a 
constitutional frame is question-begging. The interaction between the ECHR and 
national legal systems, on the other hand, the paper argues, are precisely the sort of 
conflict where the concept of constitutionalism can do real work at the post-state 
level. In presenting this taxonomy as a better way of understanding normative 
pluralism in Europe, it concludes by introducing an argument against pluralism in the 
relationship between EU law and national law, arguing that the attitude of national 
courts such as the German Constitutional Court should be viewed as a form of 
institutional civil disobedience which is a normal aspect of any constitutional order, 
rather than requiring the positing of an overarching constitutional frame binding EU 
and national courts. 
Introduction
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The proliferation of juris-generative sites at the post-state level in the post-war era 
regulating as diverse subjects as human rights, global trade, the internet and sport, has 
produced an array of legal systems existing alongside state legal systems and 
expanded the scope of traditional international law.1 That these systems interact and 
frequently come into conflict is evidenced by the increase in high profile cases 
involving the application of more than one legal system, offering different potential 
outcomes to the dispute at hand.2 Perhaps nowhere is this development more acute 
than in Europe, where the establishment of regional supranational courts overseeing 
regional agreements on human rights, trade and economic integration, impact and 
influence national legal systems to an unprecedented extent.3 
In the European context, the law of European integration in particular 
entailing the free movement of the factors of production under the auspices of the 
European Union (EU),4 and particularly its ‘commerce clause’ equivalent5 have come 
into conflict with national constitutional provisions protecting fundamental rights. 
Similarly, the law of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and the 
European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) interpretation thereof, have conflicted 
with both national understanding of analogous rights as well as had impact on a wide 
area of national policy which has met with resistance from national administrations. 
For example, severe constitutional restrictions on abortion services 
(encapsulating prohibition on the dissemination of information outside the 
jurisdiction), have collided with rights to freedom of information and the free 
movement of services;6  the right to freedom of expression and assembly  and 
constitutional protection of human dignity has conflicted with the free movement of 
goods,7 the implementation of global sanctions by the United Nations security  council 
have conflicted with regional commitments to human rights both under the ECHR8 
but also, latterly  under the EU legal system;9  military operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have raised conflicts between differing regional human rights 
commitments and international humanitarian law10; all which speak to a veritable 
2
1  For an overview, see ‘Symposium: constitutionalism in an era of globalization and 
privatization’ (2008) 6(3-4) International Journal of Constitutional Law, 371-530. 
2 Examples include the conflicts between international human rights and humanitarian law which arose 
in R (Al-Saadoon) v. Secretary of State for Defence [2010] All E.R. 271 discussed in M. Milanovic, 
‘Norm Conflict in International Law: Whither Human Rights?’  (2009) Duke Journal of Comparative 
and International law, 20, 69 and the law of the UN charter and EU law which arose in Cases 
C-402/05P and C-415/05P, Kadi and Al Barakaat, Judgment of 3 September 2008.
3 Specifically the legal system of the (now) European Union originating in the in Rome Treaty of 1957 
and the European Convention of Human Rights signed in 1950.
4 See now the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union O.J. 
C/83 30.3.2010.
5 Article 30 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union.
6  In the EU context,  see Case 159/90, SPUC v. Grogan [1991] ECR I-4685, and the ECHR context 
Open Door Counselling v. Ireland A 246-A (1993); 15 EHRR 244 and Case No. 25579/05, A, B &  C v. 
Ireland, Judgment 16 December 2010.
7 See cases C-112/00, Schmidberger v. Austria, [2003] ECR I-5659, Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen 
[2004] ECR I-9609. 
8 See App. No. 10593/08, Nada v. Switzerland. (Judgment Pending).
9 Bosphorus Airways v. Ireland 2005-VI; 42 EHRR 1; and Kadi, (2008) above. 
10 Al-Skieni v. UK (no. 55721/07), judgment pending.
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‘soup’ of normative orders engaging, interacting and conflicting in the attainment of 
their various, often incompatible, goals. 
This mutual coexistence and sporadic conflict inevitably raise questions as to 
the precise nature and status of conflicting legal systems and, in particular, whether 
any sort of discipline can be imposed on this ‘disorder of orders’11, and whether any 
priority can be established between them to facilitate adjudication before courts. In 
this regard, constitutionalism has become an increasingly popular method of 
characterising these non-state systems as well as providing a device to manage 
conflict by providing normative criteria against which courts can apply, or indeed 
disapply, the norms of one legal system as opposed to another.12
More specifically, the former sense, the idea is that certain of these post state 
legal regimes are themselves constitutional. Thus, the legal system of the EU with its 
claims to direct effect, primacy over national law and implied powers, has been 
generally  understood to be making constitutional claims such that its legal order is 
more akin to a domestic rather than an international one.13  Similarly, the European 
Court of Human Rights has been described as a ‘constitutional court for Europe’,14 a 
claim which has been bolstered by the recent introduction of ‘pilot judgements’ to 
manage the large number of repeat litigation arriving at the Court.15 
 The second significant way in which constitutionalism has entered legal 
discourse regarding post-state legal regimes in Europe has been as a way  of 
characterising conflict between regimes. Constitutional pluralism has been offered as 
a way of characterising normative conflict  both in the sense of mutual acceptance 
between conflicting orders as to the constitutional status of the other, as well as by 
providing a ‘metaconstitutional’ framework within which to manage and resolve 
conflicts between the regimes.16 In this second sense, constitutionalism operates as a 
higher order frame resolving systemic conflict by providing an important ordering 
function in respect of the different legal orders but still somehow separate from, and 
external to, the orders themselves. 
 This importation of constitutionalism as a way of understanding and managing 
conflicts between the EU and ECHR and national law, and particularly the 
introduction of ‘meta constitutional’ norms into the post-state arena will form the 
Cormac'Mac'Amhlaigh,'Edinburgh'Law'School
3
11  N.  Walker,  ‘Beyond boundary disputes and basic grids: Mapping the global disorder of normative 
orders’ (2008) 6 (3/4) I*CON 373-396.
12 For a recent examples see P. Dobner and M. Loughlin,  The Twilight of Constitutionalism?,  (Oxford: 
OUP, 2010); J.  Dunoff and J.  Trachtman (eds.),  Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International 
Law and Global Governance,  (Cambridge, CUP, 2009) and J. Klabbers, A.  Peters & G. Ulfstein, The 
Constitutionalization of International Law, (Oxford: OUP, 2009).
13 See generally, J. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe, (Cambridge: CUP 1999)
14  L. Wildhaber, ‘A Constitutional Future for the European Court of Human Rights?’ (2002) 23(5-7) 
Human Rights Law Journal, 161-165.  See also S. Greer, ‘Constitutionalizing Adjudication under the 
European Convention on Human Rights’ (2003) 23 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 405-433.
15 For a comprehensive discussion of this development see W. Sadurski,  ‘Partnering with Strasbourg: 
Constitutionalisation of the European Court of Human Rights, The Accession of Central and East 
European States to the Council of Europe, and the Idea of Pilot Judgments’ (2009) 9(3) Human Rights 
Law Review, 397-453. 
16 N. Walker, ‘Flexibility within a metaconstitutional frame: reflections on the future of legal authority 
in Europe’ in G. de Búrca & J. Scott,  Constitutional Change in the EU: From Uniformity to Flexibility, 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000). 
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focus of this paper. It will trace the genealogy  of constitutional pluralist discourses in 
the European context before analysing examples of conflicts between national legal 
orders and that of the EU and ECHR. It  will then proceed to challenge the current 
state of the literature describing EU conflicts in terms of ‘constitutional pluralism’ and 
ECHR conflicts as more radical pluralism. In doing so it will problematise the 
concept of constitutionalism in order to illustrate that the constitutional label is more 
appropriate to ECHR conflicts where there is agreement on common values than the 
EU, which relate to the question of sovereignty and are therefore not amenable to 
constitutional resolution. It concludes by  arguing that EU conflicts are better 
understood as not being pluralist at all but as forms of ‘institutional disobedience’ 
which is part of any governing constitutional authority. 
 
A Genealogy of Constitutional Pluralism in Europe
The founding father of European constitutional pluralism is undisputedly Neil 
MacCormick, who developed the notion throughout the 1990s in response to the 
changing legal landscape of EU law.17  The authority of EU law had developed 
considerably over the 60s and 70s such that its central doctrines of primacy,18 direct 
effect19 and interpretative autonomy 20 had become accepted by  national judicial actors 
(and those who rejected it had the good manners to keep reasonably  quiet about it by 
refusing to make preliminary references or finding that EU was not applicable to the 
particular case at hand). However the Maastricht decision of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVG), shattered this complacent 
picture of the obedient reception of EU law into national legal systems.21 The BVG 
found, almost as a side issue to the controversy  at  hand –the constitutionality of 
German ratification of the Treaty  on European Union in 1993 - that in cases of 
conflict between EU law and the German Constitution, that the German constitution 
would prevail. The decision blew a hole in the hierarchical Kelsen-inspired view of 
the EU legal order as a hierarchical constitutional legal system perched at the apex of 
national legal systems as encouraged by the ECJ’s constitutionalising decisions, 
particularly the primacy doctrine. 
Drawing on his own formulation of legal systems in terms of institutional 
normative orders, MacCormick found that EU and national legal orders made 
legitimate claims to their own authority, in this sense were constitutional, and as such, 
both claims were to be taken seriously.22 It  was in the nature of institutional normative 
4
17  N. MacCormick, ‘Beyond the Sovereign State’  (1993) 56(1) Modern Law Review, 1-18; ‘The 
Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now’ (1995) 1(3) European Law Journal,  259-266; ‘Risking 
Constitutional Collision in Europe?’  (1998) 18(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 517-532; collected 
in refined in Questioning Sovereignty (OUP: 1999). 
18 Established in Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585.
19 Established in Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 13.
20 Case 314/85, Firma Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1997] ECR 4199.
21 Brunner v. The European Union Treaty [1994] 1 CMLR 57.
22  As MacCormick himself notes there is an affinity between the notion of an institutional normative 
order and systems theoretical approaches to legal systems as ‘autopoietic’  social systems. See 
Questioning Sovereignty, above, p. 109.
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orders that they are self-referentially authoritative and therefore they cannot be 
hierarchically ordered. Thus, the interaction and conflicts between these legal systems 
entailed an ‘epistemic pluralism’23  whereby  the resolution of a particular clash 
between national and supranational legal systems would depend on the viewpoint 
from which the conflict was approached. Thus, there was no privileged position, no 
‘Archimedean’ point from which the claims of EU law or national law could be 
adjudicated in order to resolve a particular legal conflict. 
For MacCormick, this could not be otherwise as the actors involved approach 
the question of conflict from different  vantage points, with reference to different 
normative systems, national and supranational which could only yield an answer 
according to that system. It was self-evident that ‘the highest authority in any 
normative order can appeal to no higher positive confirmation of its own authority 
than that enshrined in its own jurisprudence.’24 
The resulting scenario was characterised by MacCormick in terms of a 
pluralist conception of law and legal system, implicitly drawing on sociological and 
anthropological accounts of legal pluralism.25  However, rather than pluralism 
obtaining between informal and culturally-based norms and formal institutional legal 
structures redolent of conventional legal pluralism, MacCormick posited a legal 
pluralism between formal structures of positive law, national and supranational, 
replete with Grundnorm or rule of recognition and their own internally coherent 
hierarchy. 26 The initial formulation of this constitutional pluralist  conception of law 
was ‘radical’ in that the law had nothing to say about the resolution of such conflicts 
given that an overarching applicable law was unavailable in the pluralist universe. 
Thus the clash of legal regimes was analogous to realist ‘billiard ball’ theories of 
International Relations where conflict was an inevitable feature of systemic 
interaction.27   However, MacCormick subsequently  went on to develop a more 
nuanced account of this regime conflict, whereby he reasoned that both national and 
supranational legal orders were subject to the overarching authority of international 
law.28 Thus legal conflict between national constitutional norms and those of EU law 
could be resolved according to the authority of the international legal system, a 
position which he eponymously dubbed ‘pluralism under international law’.29 
On this solid foundation, constitutional pluralism has become a force to be 
reckoned with in European Constitutional discourse, and in constitutional theory more 
generally. Subsequent scholars have put flesh on the bones of MacCormick’s pluralist 
insights by theorising the ontology of constitutional pluralism30 as well as providing 
mechanisms for the resolution of constitutional pluralism in the EU and ECHR 
contexts by  reference to systems other than international law. Of the various ways of 
Cormac'Mac'Amhlaigh,'Edinburgh'Law'School
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23 N. Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2002) 65(3) Modern Law Review, 317, at 338.
24 MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty, above, pp. 109.
25  See N. Krisch, ‘The Case for Pluralism in Postnational Law’, LSE Law, Society and Economy 
Working Papers, 12/2009.
26  Krisch,  The Case for Pluralism, p. 14. For more conventional accounts of legal pluralism, see J. 
Griffiths, ‘What is Legal Pluralism?’ (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism 1. 
27  For a classic account, see H. J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and 
Peace, (New York: NY: Knopf, 1948). 
28 MacCormick, Risking Constitutional Collision, and Questioning Sovereignty, pp. 117.
29 Ibid.
30 See N. Walker, The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism above. 
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thinking about pluralism in European legal conflicts, three approaches in particular 
stand out in respect of EU legal conflicts; Mattias Kumm’s model of 
Constitutionalism Beyond the State,31  Miguel Maduro’s principles of contrapunctual 
law32  and Sabel and Gerstenberg’s more recent ‘polyarchic’ co-ordinate 
constitutionalism33; and Krisch’s characterisation of the ‘open architecture’ of 
European human rights law stands out in respect of the ECHR system.34
Pluralism and the EU Legal Order
Kumm’s model of ‘Constitutionalism Beyond the State’ provides a framework 
for the resolution of conflicts between national the EU legal orders.35 He identifies 
three specific scenarios in which such conflicts may arise. Firstly, conflict may occur 
where the application of EU law threatens the rights contained in a national bill of 
rights protected in national constitutions. The second scenario in which such conflicts 
may arise relate to questions of who gets to decide who decides the boundaries of the 
legality or constitutionality of EU law. Finally, such conflicts may emerge with 
respect to constitutional provisions that  reflect ‘specific national commitments’36 but 
are of not the first special category  of fundamental rights. Examples of this category 
include the Greek constitutional requirement of compulsory  higher education in 
Greece and the German restrictions on military service.37 These issues could (and in 
many cases are) regulated by ordinary statute in other jurisdictions. 
In order to manage these conflicts Kumm develops principles of 
Constitutionalism beyond the state which are to inform and guide adjudication in 
cases of conflicts between national and EU law in the scenarios outlined above. 
Rather than making a ‘tragic choice’ choosing one regime over the other as radical 
pluralism entails, Kumm advocates that courts take inspiration from both regimes 
according to the principle of best fit.38 Thus, for Kumm:39 
6
31  Developed in M. Kumm, ‘Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe?’ (1999) 36 
Common Market Law Review, 351, and ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional 
Supremacy before and after the Constitutional Treaty’ (2005) 11(3) European Law Journal, 262-307.
32  M. Maduro, ‘Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action’ in N. Walker(ed.), 
Sovereignty in Transition, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003), 501-38 and ‘Europe and the Constitution: 
What if this is as good as it gets?’ in J. H. H. Weiler & M. Wind, European Constitutionalism Beyond 
the State, (CUP: 2003), 74-102. 
33  C. Sabel and O. Gerstenberg, ‘Constitutionalising an Overlapping Consensus: the ECJ and the 
Emergence of a Coordinate Constitutional Order’ (2010) 16(5) European Law Journal, 511-550. 
34  N. Krisch, ‘The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law’ (2008) 71(2) Modern Law 
Review, 183-216.
35 Kumm, Arbiter and Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict, above.
36 Kumm, Jurisprudence, 296.
37 Kumm, Jurisprudence, 297.
38 Kumm, Jurisprudence, 286. The affinity between this approach and Dworkin’s notion of best fit as 
part of his theory of integrity is explicitly acknowledged by Kumm. The Dworkinian elements of this 
model are further evident in his rephrasing of the question in terms of what makes national and 
European constitutional practice in Europe appear in its best light?, Jurisprudence, 286; drawing on 
Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (1986).
39 Kumm, Jurisprudence, 286.
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‘the right conflict rule or set of conflicts rules for a national judge to adopt is 
the one that is best calculated to produce the best solution to realise the ideals 
underlying legal practice in the European Union and its Member states’. 
 Kumm goes on to elaborate the conflict rules for such collisions in terms of an 
open-ended series of framework principles. At the top of the list, a ‘priority to 
legality’ principle40, creates a presumption in favour of the effective and uniform 
enforcement of EU law. Thus, the starting point of any question of conflict between 
EU and national constitutional law must be the commitment to the uniform and 
effective application of EU law. This presumption is, however, rebuttable, by three 
sub-principles; fundamental rights protection, subsidiarity and democratic 
legitimacy.41 The principle of legality can be subjected to constitutional review, if and 
only if, the application of EU law threatens fundamental rights and EU law does not 
offer adequate protection to fundamental rights protection in the national court’s 
view.42 With respect of subsidiarity, national courts are within their rights to disregard 
EU law where it  deems the EU institutions to have transgressed their jurisdictional 
boundaries and acted ultra vires and there are insufficient safeguards (presumably, for 
example, judicial review) to ensure that the EU acts within the limits of the treaties.43 
Finally, the principle of democratic legitimacy  can dislodge the presumption of the 
effectiveness and uniformity  of EU law where national courts deem EU law to violate 
specific national constitutional commitments to the democracy, such as, for example, 
the right to vote and the rights of democratically  elected institutions to govern and 
make policy which have been common themes in the BVGs decisions on the 
constitutionality of German treaty ratification.44 
 These principles, then, provide a ‘starting point and structuring device’45 
without dictating any particular outcomes in individual cases, but rather fostering 
‘mutual deliberative engagement’46 between national and supranational actors.
 A similar deliberative approach to conflicts between EU law and national law 
informs Maduro’s solution, couched in terms of the musical device of counterpoint.47 
In his ‘principles of contrapuntal law’ Maduro, like Kumm, devises a series of 
considerations or rules to be utilised by courts when facing conflicts between national 
and EU law. Using the ‘radical pluralism’ position as his starting point, and accepting 
the inevitability  of the self-referential nature of legal systems, Maduro argues that in 
practice, both national and supranational actors engage in mutual construction of the 
EU legal order through mutual accommodation, however principles are necessary  to 
reduce and manage the conflicts as well as providing a way of promoting 
communication between courts.48 
Cormac'Mac'Amhlaigh,'Edinburgh'Law'School
7
40  Priority to rights is central to Alexy’s ‘balancing’ model of constitutional rights.  See R. Alexy,  A 
Theory of Constitutional Rights, (OUP: 2002) and ‘Constitutional Rights, Balancing and 
Rationality’ (2003) 16(2) Ratio Juris, 131-40.
41 Kumm, Jurisprudence, 299-300.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid
45 Kumm, Jurisprudence, p. 301.
46 Ibid.
47 Maduro, Contrapunctual Law and As good as it gets?, above. 
48 Maduro, Contrapunctual Law, 524.
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 For Maduro, all actors engaged in the process of developing EU 
constitutionalism must commit to the principles of pluralism, consistency and vertical 
and horizontal coherence, universalisability  and institutional choice which provide the 
common basis for discourse. Like Kumm’s model, these principles are ‘framework 
principles’, which he frames in terms of Sunstein’s ‘incompletely theorised 
agreements’,49  which attempt to balance the competing considerations of harmony 
and diversity in a complex configuration such as the EU. 
 The principle of pluralism embodies the epistemic dimensions of 
constitutional pluralism whereby legal systems interact in a relationship  of heterarchy 
rather than hierarchy and courts accept and respect each other’s identity and self-
determination.50 The principle of consistency and coherence ensure that the pluralism 
of legal systems does not lead to fragmentation by requiring that all actors share a 
commitment to a coherent legal order and a minimal set of discourse principles.51 
Moreover national judicial actors must be cognisant that they are engaged in a 
common enterprise; that  of the construction and development of the EU legal order. 
Thus, they must not view their engagement with EU law in isolation, in a purely 
vertical relationship with the ECJ, but as one of many voices engaged in a joint 
venture with courts from other Member states. Thus, the coherence must be horizontal 
as well as vertical.52  The related principle of universalisability  is the 
instrumentalisation of the coherence principle requiring that courts, both national and 
European, are able to justify their decisions in the context of a coherent and integrated 
European legal order, such that national decisions in EU law are argued in ‘universal’ 
terms.53 More vaguely, the principle of institutional choice requires the adoption by 
courts of a new legal methodology’ according to Komesar’s comparative institutional 
analysis.54 
 Focusing on the first of Kumm’s conflict scenarios, Sabel and Gerstenberg 
analyse recent decisions involving fundamental rights conflicts such as Omega,55 
Schmidberger56 and Kadi57  to argue that in practice a ‘coordinate constitutionalism’58 
entailing a ‘jurisprudence of mutual monitoring and peer review’59  is emerging 
between normative orders in Europe. This coordinate constitutionalism does not only 
exist between the EU and national legal orders but also between national and other 
supranational orders such as the ECHR, between supranational orders themselves; the 
EU and ECHR and between supranational and international orders such as the EU and 
the UN. Thus the structure is ‘polyarchic’60  entailing a plurality  of orders and 
interactions.
8
49 Maduro, Contrapunctual Law, 525.
50 Maduro, Contrapunctual Law, 526
51 Maduro, Contrapunctual Law, 527.
52 Maduro, Contrapunctual Law, 529.
53 Maduro, Contrapunctual Law, 530.
54 Maduro, Contrapunctual Law, 531.
55 Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen, above. 
56 C-112/00, Schmidberger v. Austria, above.
57 Cases C-402/05P and C-415/05P, Kadi and Al Barakaat, Judgment of 3 September 2008.
58 Sabel & Gerstenberg, Constitutionalising an Overlapping Consensus, p. 512.
59 Ibid.
60 Sabel & Gerstenberg, Constitutionalising an Overlapping Consensus, 513.
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 Similar to the other accounts, this co-ordinate constitutionalism requires that 
legal actors respect the autonomous claims of other systems and defer to them 
provided that such defence doesn’t violate constitutional essentials as determined by 
the indigenous court of the relevant legal order. They promote the BVG’s Solange 
jurisprudence as the ideal type of this coordinate constitutionalism whereby the BVG 
agreed to defer to the norms of EU law provided that it  didn’t violate the 
constitutional essentials, in this case the rights contained in the Bill of Rights in the 
basic norm.61 Their model, then, is strongly resonant with Kumm's however Sabel and 
Gerstenberg opt for Rawls rather than Dworkin and Alexy as the inspiration for the 
framework, adopting his device of the ‘overlapping consensus’ as a model through 
which to characterise and manage such conflicts.62 The ‘freestanding political view’ 
of individuals in Rawls’ scheme in coordinate constitutionalism becomes the 
autonomy of the various legal systems viewpoints.63  Moreover, and in an echo of 
Maduro’s commitments, the participants accept a commitment to basic principles of 
justice to which the various comprehensive views of the participants must be 
calibrated.64 Out this a form of ‘public reason’ evolves which acts as a filter for the 
kind of reasons and justifications that are acceptable for individual decisions.65  As 
with the other models of constitutional pluralism, the polyarchic nature of this system 
means that  the question of final say, or Kompetenz-Kompetenz remains unresolved as 
the process is on-going and the calibration of comprehensive view to overlapping 
consensus in individual decisions is not definitive. Moreover, the model bears traits of 
Maduro’s horizontal coherence in that  the decisions must be acceptable to all the 
participants in the process which is implicit  in the public reason requirements of 
decision-making in coordinate constitutionalism. 
From Radical Pluralism to Constitutional Pluralism: Metaconstitutionalism 
 As noted above, when Neil MacCormick first sketched out his ideas of the 
potential relationship between national and supranational legal orders in the EU 
context, he opted for a conceptualisation of the relationship  in terms of ‘interactive 
rather than hierarchical’66 which represented a pluralistic rather than a monistic view 
of the EU-national law relationship. Thus, as a matter of jurisprudential logic, it was 
clear that national constitutional courts deny  the competence of an external 
adjudicative forum such as the ECJ to decide on the applicability  of the norms of the 
domestic constitutional systems and vice versa. Thus, the relationship is pluralistic in 
that there is an irreconcilable core a ‘vanishing point’67 of the national/supranational 
relationship  whereby in the final analysis, each systems claims its own interpretative 
autonomy. This pluralistic conception of legal systems, and those of the national and 
EU systems in particular, was a acknowledgment that  ‘not all legal problems can be 
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solved legally’.68 The resolution of any conflicts emerging between the systems, then, 
for MacCormick, was a matter for ‘circumspection and for political as much as legal 
judgement’.69 
 In later work, however, MacCormick offered an alternative to this position 
which he subsequently dubbed ‘radical pluralism’ to a ‘pluralism under international 
law’70  whereby the resolution of conflicts between national and supranational legal 
orders could, ultimately, be resolved with respect to the norms of public international 
law. This move entailed a conceptualisation of the legal universe as a form of 
monism, where all law ultimately derives from international law, and MacCormick 
himself acknowledged that this favoured conclusion was a particular remove from a 
truly  pluralistic conception of legal systems.71  What remained pluralist about this 
conception, however, was that the EU and national legal orders remained in a 
heterarchical and pluralist relationship albeit under the umbrella of the international 
legal order, thereby underscoring their autonomous and non-derivative status from 
each other. Thus, EU law could not claim (as could be interpreted from the federalist 
primacy doctrine) that national law was derivative from EU law from the 
jurisprudential point of view, but perhaps more importantly, Member States could not 
claim that EU law was derivative of, and therefore subordinate to, national. 
 Pluralism under international law, then, meant that international law set 
conditions on the validity  of state and EU constitutions and their interpretation 
thereby imposing ‘a framework on the interactive but not hierarchical relationship 
between systems’.72 Most significantly on this view, MacCormick’s pluralism under 
international law meant that ‘we need not run out of law (and into politics) quite as 
fast as suggested by radical pluralism’.73
 The risks associated with running from law to politics were not explored by 
MacCormick himself. However, the rationale for imposing a frame of rules or 
principles on the interaction between national and supranational legal systems is 
explicitly addressed at length by  Kumm.74 Kumm recognises the problems faced by 
courts in cases of constitutional conflict and particularly the limited capacity of courts 
to take overtly  political decisions. If radical pluralism entails judges engaging in 
judicial realpolitik, their own legitimacy comes into question as judicial actors.75 Not 
only this, but as the ‘weakest political branch’76, the overtly  political decisions they 
make are futile unless they receive the endorsement of political actors.77  These 
questions of the legitimacy of courts in public law adjudication are not particular to 
10
68 MacCormick, Sovereignty Now, 265.
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70 MacCormick, Risking Constitutional Conflict, p. 527, Questioning Sovereignty p. 117. 
71 Ibid.
72 MacCormick, Risking Constitutional Conflict, 529.
73 MacCormick, Risking Constitutional Conflict, 531.
74 Kumm, Jurisprudence, 279.
75 For a forceful critique of constitutional pluralism in EU law based on concerns of judicial legitimacy 
and the rule of law, see J. Baquero-Cruz, ‘The Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist 
Movement’ (2008) 14(4) European Law Journal, 389-422, at 414.
76 Kumm, Jurisprudence, 279 quoting from A. Hamilton, Federalist, (Buccaneer Books,  1992) and A. 
Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court as the Bar of Politics (Yale University Press, 
1962) 
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normative conflicts however they are thrown into sharp relief in this context due to 
multilevel or pluralistic legal universe in which they operate. Thus, for reasons of 
legitimacy  and efficiency, Kumm emphasises the necessity of legal reasoning, where 
law ‘constrains and guides the decision maker’78  which is part of the ‘division of 
labour’ in constitutional systems and, more importantly ensures the legitimacy of 
courts in the decision-making process.79 
 What is central to the development of principles of constitutional pluralism is 
the existence of some sort  of external standards by  which EU constitutional conflicts 
can be resolved, both to ensure the coherence of the structure overall80, as well as to 
prevent courts, both national and supranational, becoming purely  ‘political’ actors, 
making decisions according to legally  unconstrained political factors81  thereby 
undermining their legitimacy. Thus principles of constitutionalism beyond the state, 
contrapunctual law and co-ordinate constitutionalism are designed, in part, to manage 
these problems.
 What all this speaks to, it is submitted, is a preponderance of theorising 
constitutional conflicts in Europe in favour of restraints and order on pluralistic 
conceptions of European law and a shift from legal pluralism simpliciter to 
constitutional pluralism. In this regard, what constitutional pluralism presupposes, 
then, is a metaconstitution which provides an ‘authoritative version of the … political 
order’82  and a ‘legitimating trans-systemic canopy’83  over the whole. These 
metaconstitutional standards, be they Kummian principles, the higher order of 
MacCormick’s international law, principles of contrapuntal law or the overlapping 
consensus of coordinate constitutionalism, are not the constitutional rules themselves 
but ‘rules about constitutional rules’.84  The constitutional epithet in constitutional 
pluralism, moreover, relates to ‘higher or deeper constitutional authority’85  of these 
metaconstitutional rules and principles which therefore constitute, if not higher law, 
then higher guiding principles above and beyond the interacting legal systems 
themselves. As such this ultimate hierarchical ordering of rules or principles under an 
overarching metaconstitution speaks to the constitutionalising of legal pluralism in 
Europe. 
 The constitutional pedigree of these metaconstitutional rules is evident in the 
adoption of state-based domestic constitutional theories to devise principles and 
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standards to order such conflict. As noted above, for example, Kumm draws on 
Dworkin’s conception of constitutional principles as part of the conception of law in 
his constitutionalism beyond the state86 as well as Alexy’s theories of ‘balancing’ to 
manage in a normative fashion, the rival interests at stake.87  Maduro, adopts 
Sunstein’s conception of ‘incompletely  theorised agreements’ which provide, in 
Sunstein’s account, the foundation of constitutional order.88  Similarly, Sable and 
Gerstenberg’s coordinate constitutionalism is, like Kumm’s constitutionalism beyond 
the state, more overtly  constitutional in its title, and draws upon the Rawlsian model 
of overlapping consensus to produce the metaconstitutional principles which inform 
the interaction of legal systems in Europe. 89  This constitutional function of 
overlapping consensus was explicitly acknowledge by Rawls;:90
‘[t]he idea of an overlapping consensus enables us to understand how a constitutional 
regime characterised by  the fact of pluralism might, despite its deep divisions, achieve 
stability  and social unit  y by the public recognition of a reasonable political 
conception of justice’ 
 Finally, whereas MacCormick does not explicitly  state it, his pluralism under 
international law speaks to a constitutional conception of the international legal order 
as metaconstitution, providing the hierarchical and authoritative rules on the 
behaviour of states (and indeed non states such as the EU).91  The analogies with 
Kelsen’s later monistic conception of the legal universe in terms serves to support the 
constitutional credentials of MacCormick’s pluralism under international law.92
The ECHR: the poor relation of supranational Constitutionalism
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Notwithstanding an early passable imitation by the ECtHR of the ECJ’s 
constitutionalising judgments,93 the notion of the ECHR as a constitutional system has 
been a relatively recent phenomenon.94 This view has, in part been prompted by more 
daring recent pronouncements from the Court itself defining the Convention in terms 
of a ‘constitutional instrument of a European Public Order’.95  The late evolution of 
ECHR constitutionalism is perhaps explicable by the notable absence of claims by the 
ECtHR comparable to the ECJ in its case law claiming the direct  effect and primacy 
of the norms of the Convention system over national law, the articulation of 
constitutional principles of adjudication being the most developed element of ECHR 
constitutionalism.96  Also the all-important element of hierarchy so central to EU 
constitutionalism as instrumentalised in the primacy doctrine, has been explicitly 
refuted by the ECtHR which has repeatedly insisted on the primary responsibility of 
Contracting states to ensure the protection of fundamental rights and the ‘subsidiary’ 
nature of the Court’s supervision.97 Moreover, the characterisation of the ECHR in 
constitutional terms tends to be based on pragmatic grounds to reduce the ECHR’s 
immense workload rather than ontological or normative considerations.98  As such, 
and even in the most constitutionalist literature, the consensus seems to be that the 
ECHR system falls more into the international legal category  than the sui generis or 
‘thicker constitutional’ EU system. 
 Notwithstanding its more frugal constitutional pedigree and the more modest 
claims and demands made by  the Court on the Convention’s signatory states, the 
relationship  between national law and the ECHR has not been plain sailing.99 
Arguably as a reaction to a more confident bench at Strasbourg in part due to the 
reforms of the 1990s100 the Court has become increasingly  demanding with respect to 
the compatibility  of state measures with the Convention, and has given states a 
narrow berth under its (in)famous margin of appreciation, resulting in more 
contentious and conflictual relations between national courts and the ECtHR.101 These 
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conflicts have resulted in more attention being paid to the ECtHR and the conflicts 
between the convention and particularly its interpretation by the Court, and national 
law. Krisch’s recent work is exemplary in this regard.102 
In terms of the pluralist element in the potential conflicts between national 
systems and the ECHR systems, Krisch, as part of his thesis on the pluralist structure 
of postnational law more generally,103  identifies pluralism as providing the ‘open 
architecture’ of the ECHR system.104 He explicitly rejects the constitutional model of 
pluralism for the ECHR system due to its homogenising and hierarchical tendencies 
which fail to capture the fragmented realities of post-national society  as well as the 
rejection of hierarchy by those dealing with interactions between the systems.105 
However, the ‘open architecture’ does not rely on a rigid dualism, according to which 
domestic constitutional and public international law pass like ships in the night. 
Rather, echoing MacCormick’s radical pluralism, national law and the law of the 
ECHR are in a heterarchical relationship.106  However this heterarchy  lacks the 
‘canopy’ of an overarching ‘metaconstitution’ which can resolve disputes between the 
systems.107 Thus, unlike Kumm and Baquero-Cruz, Krisch does not decry the courts’ 
dabbling in political questions, and does not attempt to elaborate a scheme of 
principles or structural framework within which conflicts could be resolved to 
overcome the anxieties associated with judicial realpolitik outlined above. Rather, in 
the ECHR system, conflicts are resolved, ‘through politics rather than legal 
argument’108, though the more diplomatic and persuasive mechanisms of ‘judicial 
politics’109 such as the margin of appreciation and the evolutive approach (a form of 
interpretative instrumentalism).110 These ‘central political tools in a pluralist order’111 
are the characteristic doctrines of the ECHR system, and the guarantor of its pluralist 
nature equivalent to the way that direct effect and primacy are the lynchpin of the 
constitutional credentials of the EU. 
 Notwithstanding the inclusion of ‘constitutional’ in their account of the 
interaction between the ECHR and other legal systems, Sabel and Gerstenberg arrive 
at a very similar (pluralist) conception of ECHR law to Krisch where the relationship 
is characterised by heterarchy with ‘no final decider and no Archimedean point’.112 
While burnishing the ECHR’s constitutional credentials to a greater extent than 
Krisch, Sabel and Gerstenberg similarly identify  the margin of appreciation and 
‘evolutive interpretation’ as central to the Court’s ‘experimentalist  and dialogic form 
of review’,113 speaking to a more pluralist characterisation of the system than that of 
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the EU where the systems ‘interact’ and ‘negotiate’ the meaning of legal principle.114 
Also absent here is an attempt to fashion or define an overarching ‘metaconstitution’ 
which would apply to cases and guide courts in the resolution of conflict between the 
systems. Thus, constitutionalism and pluralism, much less constitutional pluralism is 
less developed in the ECHR system, jettisoning the notion of a metaconstitution115 
and leaving the negotiation of conflict to judicial politics.
Questioning Constitutional Pluralism 
 What is clear from contemporary  discourses in the interaction between legal 
regimes, national, EU and ECHR, then, is that conflicts between national law and EU 
law are characterised in constitutional terms, in the sense of being resolved through 
rules of principles of an overarching ‘metaconstitution’, thereby ameliorating the level 
of judicial politics and providing a normative resolution to problems of legal conflict. 
On the other hand, conflicts between the ECHR and national law take place through 
mutual engagement but in the absence of a metaconstitutional superstructure which 
would govern the relationship and clashes between then. 
 It is precisely this snapshot of the management of constitutional conflict in 
Europe which I wish to challenge in the remainder of this paper. Focusing on the 
meaning and function of constitutionalism and constitutional theory, it  will be argued 
that, in fact, the reverse of the picture outlined here is the case. Conflicts between EU 
law and national law, given the claims to primacy and autonomy made by  the ECJ are, 
in the final analysis, about sovereignty and are therefore not susceptible to 
management or resolution according to a metaconstitution. On the other hand, 
conflicts between the ECHR and national legal systems are about disagreements about 
the meaning of constitutive values and are therefore precisely the stuff of 
constitutionalism. To illustrate this, it  is worth revisiting examples of conflicts 
between the EU and ECHR systems with national law in order to better understand 
their nature. Two recent  decisions from Germany and the UK provide clear examples 
of these conflicts; the BVG’s Lisbon decision116  and the UK Supreme Court’s 
decision in Horncastle.117 
Maastricht Redux: The BVG’s ‘Lisbon’ Judgment 
 The boldness shown by the BVG in its Maastricht decision in 1993 was 
contagious, with ever more national supreme courts following its lead in finding for 
‘national constitutional primacy’ in the relationship between EU and national law.118 
Even if the pluralist conception of EU law became increasingly adopted as the default 
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position of national supreme courts, the BVG again found itself at  the forefront of the 
pluralist movement in its decision on the constitutionality of German ratification of 
the Lisbon treaty  handed down in June 2009.119 As with the Maastricht decision 16 
years earlier, the decision is paradigmatic of conflicts and pluralism in the relationship 
between national and EU law.120  Once more, the discussion and reasoning of the 
decision was more significant that the final decision taken, given that the court found 
that German ratification of the Lisbon treaty would not violate the German 
constitution per se, but the most significant and interesting part of the judgment are 
the Court’s deliberations on the nature of EU law and, more importantly from the 
pluralist perspective, the relationship  between EU law and national law. The subject 
of the challenge was the constitutionality of German ratification of the Lisbon Treaty 
of 2008, however the real target of the decision was the ECJ’s claims regarding the 
primacy and autonomy of the EU’s legal order as well as its assertion of its own 
interpretative autonomy regarding the extent and limits of EU law which was 
forcefully reprised in its Kadi decision.121
 The challenge was based on the alleged violation of various provisions of the 
German constitution, in particular the constitutional protection of democracy and the 
right to vote contained in Articles 38 and 20 of the basic law122 as well as the limits of 
permissible integration established by the constitution in Article 23 combined with 
Article 79, the so-called ‘eternity’ clause which places an absolute prohibition on the 
amendment of certain provision of the basic law.123  In terms of the typologies of 
conflicts between EU law and national law outlined by Kumm, then, this case dealt 
primarily  with the question of the patrolling of the limits on European integration 
imposed by the constitution which could include review of the activities of the EU 
institutions, including the ECJ itself, from acting ultra vires. Moreover, as was argued 
before, and accepted by, the Court, the right to vote and the principle of democracy 
could be threatened by European integration where the level of integration had 
evolved to such an extent that national institutions, for which German citizens voted, 
had transferred so much power to Brussels that they no longer retained any significant 
governing power making the right to vote - in the sense of having a say  in the 
composition of the bodies which take political decisions – illusory.124 This could not, 
the Court argued, be compensated by the democratic nature of the European 
Parliament nor the indirect democratic legitimacy  of the Council of Ministers. 
However, what is most significant from the point of view of pluralism, was the 
rejection of the ECJ’s claims to the primacy of EU law and the autonomy both of the 
EU legal order and its own autonomy vis-à-vis the interpretation of that order. This 
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was achieved through the Court’s own tendentious characterisation of the EU qua 
political actor and polity. 
 Reprising its position in Maastricht with respect to the nature of the EU in 
constitutional terms, the Court found that the EU was not a state but rather an 
‘association of sovereign states’,125  which was clear from the operation of the 
activities of the EU according to the principle of conferral.126 As such, the Member 
States of the EU remain the ‘masters of the Treaties’127  whereas the EU exercised 
only ‘derived public authority’128 which had ‘secondary  i.e. delegated, responsibility’ 
for the tasks conferred on it.129 As such, the EU itself emphatically lacked Kompetenz-
Kompetenz, a situation which was not changed by the Lisbon reforms.130 Therefore, 
the ‘substance’ of the authority  of the German state, the German constituent power, 
was not undermined or threatened by the EU. 
 In terms of the legal effects of EU law in the light of this particular political 
ontology, the Court found that the primacy doctrine does not affect the validity of 
conflicting provisions of national law but rather ‘only inhibits its application to the 
extent required by  the treaty and permitted by them under national legislation adopted 
to give effect to them within the Member states’.131 The Court found that Declaration 
No. 17 on the primacy of EU law attached to the Lisbon Treaty, which constitutes an 
express political recognition and endorsement of the primacy doctrine as formulated 
by the ECJ, did not ‘recognise an absolute primacy of application of EU law’132 which 
would in any case not be constitutional, but rather ‘confirms’ national constitutional 
courts’ position on primacy  and particularly the supervisory function of national 
constitutional courts with respect to national constitutions. It emphatically  rejected a 
position whereby primacy would be equated with the hierarchy of federal law in 
federal systems which would ‘allow for a derogation from contrary  constitutional law 
of the Member States’.133 
  As such, then, with respect to the question of the ‘last word’ or ‘final arbiter’ 
of constitutionality  in Europe, the court asserted its own ‘right to pass final 
judgment’134 on the constitutionality  and the validity of the laws applying on German 
territory. In case there was any ambiguity as to the Court’s attitude to the primacy and 
interpretative autonomy of the EU legal order, the court concluded that:135 
‘Member States courts with a constitutional function may not, within the limits of the 
competences conferred on them – as is the position of the Basic Law - be deprived of 
the responsibility for the boundaries of their constitutional empowerment for 
integration and for the safeguarding of inviolable constitutional identity. 
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 Whereas this finding does not differ significantly  from the Court’s position in 
the Maastricht decision, it is striking in its categorical rejection of the ECJ’s claims to 
the ‘special and original nature’136 of EU law which justified its primacy over national 
(even national constitutional) law. Moreover, this reaffirmation of national 
constitutional supremacy occurred even in the light of the express political 
recognition of the primacy of EU law in Declaration 17 appended to the Lisbon 
Treaty. As such, then, the Lisbon judgment, like the Maastricht decision before it, 
reaffirmed the pluralist conception of the EU legal order. 
Conflict and Dialogue: the UK Supreme Court’s ‘Horncastle’ decision
  With respect to the ECHR system, the recent Horncastle judgment of the UK 
Supreme court, like the BVG’s Lisbon decision, represents a particularly  clear 
illustration of pluralism between national law and the law of the ECHR.137  The 
decision involved the interpretation of the right  to a fair trial, enshrined in Article 6 of 
the ECHR which has been implemented into UK law through the Human Rights Act 
1998 (HRA).138  More specifically, the case involved the admissibility of hearsay 
evidence in a number of criminal trials which had led to the conviction of the 
defendants in a series of joined cases. In each of the cases, evidence had been 
introduced by  the prosecution which the defendants had been unable to challenge due 
to the fact that the witness was deceased by the time the trial was heard, the witness 
was too intimated to give evidence in open court or the evidence was based on 
computer generated information. The defendants claimed that the leading of this 
evidence in their respective trials violated their right to a fair trial under Article 6 
ECHR, particularly Art. 6(1)(3)(d) which provides that everyone charged with a 
criminal offence has the right  to inter alia ‘examine or have examined witnesses 
against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf 
under the same conditions as witnesses against him’.139 
The impugned UK statute, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (CJA) as a rule 
prohibited the admission of hearsay evidence, however it did carve out specific 
limited exceptions to the admission of hearsay evidence, in particular where a witness 
who provided evidence was unavailable for cross examination for some reason such 
as death or intimidation.140  These exceptions were, themselves, subject to particular 
conditions or ‘safeguards’ which the British Courts had found countered the problems 
with the admission of hearsay evidence. Thus, the case before the court was whether 
the provisions of the CJA 2003 violated the right of a defendant to cross-examine 
witnesses in court enshrined in article 6 ECHR and whether they should ‘read down’ 
the statute141 to concord with Article 6 pursuant to s. 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, 
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or issue a declaration that the provisions of the act which permit  the use of hearsay 
evidence in trial was incompatible with the Convention under s. 4 HRA 1998. 
What was particularly significant in this case, particularly from the viewpoint 
of pluralist conceptions of the ECHR, judicial dialogues and constitutionalism, was 
the obligation placed on the judiciary by s. 2 HRA 1998 to ‘take into account’ the case 
law of the ECtHR. It was a matter of settled law that the default position of UK courts 
was that they should follow ECtHR case in the absence of exceptional circumstances, 
a rule contained in Lord Bingham’s dictum in Ullah that: ‘[w]hile such case law is not 
strictly binding, it has been held that courts should, in the absence of some special 
circumstances, follow any clear and constant jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court 
[and that] it follows that a national court subject to a duty  such as that imposed by 
section 2 [HRA] should not without strong reason dilute or weaken the effect of the 
Strasbourg case law. The duty  of domestic courts it  to keep pace with the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence as it evolves over time, no more but certainly no less.’142 
Thus, this statutory provision along with its authoritative interpretation 
facilitated the reception of ECtHR case law into the UK legal system as well as set the 
parameters of the relationship between British Courts and the ECtHR. The point was 
further complicated by  the fact that the ECtHR, in its various chambers, had 
pronounced on several occasions on the compatibility of hearsay  evidence from 
deceased or intimidated witnesses albeit that the case law was not entirely 
consistent.143  However, what did seem to be emerging according to the UKSC’s 
review of the ECtHR’s case law was what it called the ‘sole and decisive test’.144 This 
was most clearly formulated in the ECtHR’s decision of Luca v. Italy whereby  the 
court found that:145
“where a conviction is based solely or to a decisive degree on depositions that have 
been made by a person whom the accused has had no opportunity  to examine or to 
have examined, whether during the investigation or at the trial, the rights of the 
defence are restricted to an extent that is incompatible with the guarantees provided 
by article 6.” 
Furthermore, to add another twist to the story, the ECtHR already had an opportunity 
to adjudicate on the provisions on hearsay evidence of the CJA 2003 several months 
prior to the Horncastle decision in its Al-Khawaja decision.146 This decision resulted 
in successful prosecutions which were based primarily on evidence introduced in 
court which was not subject to cross examination by the defendant pursuant to s. 116 
CJA 2003. Reacting to claims that the admission of hearsay evidence was sufficiently 
counterbalanced by other safeguards contained in the Act, the Strasbourg court found 
that ‘ in the absence of […] special circumstances, the court doubts whether any 
counterbalancing factors would be sufficient to justify the introduction in evidence of 
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an untested statement which was the sole or decisive basis for the conviction of an 
applicant.’147
 In the event, the UKSC overtly  disagreed with the ECtHR with respect to the 
requirements of fairness of criminal proceedings and the question regarding absent 
witnesses and counterbalancing factors. The Court reviewed the criminal trial 
procedure in England and Wales finding that the overarching system was designed to 
ensure the ‘fairness, impartiality and integrity’ of the process148 which was expressed 
in a series of features of English criminal procedure including the presence of a jury 
to determine innocence or guilt as well as a number of other protections similar to 
those contained in Article 6. The Court opined that part of this fairness was the role of 
the judiciary  as ‘gate keeper’ with regard to the admissibility of certain evidence to 
ensure that the procedure was not prejudiced, including the rule against hearsay. 
Whereas the rules on hearsay had been increasingly  liberalised since the 1950s 
reflecting concerns that justice is done to the public through the effective prosecution 
of crime, safeguards had been included in the legislation to ensure that  justice was 
also done to defendants in criminal trials.149  These included a general ‘guillotine’ 
prohibition on evidence which ‘would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of 
the proceedings’ that a court should exclude it.150 Other exceptions to the rule were 
the result of ‘experience accumulated over generations and represent[ed] the product 
of concentrated consideration by experts of how the balance should be struck between 
the many competing interests affected’.151  Thus, the structure and safeguards 
governing criminal trial proceedings which culminated in the CJA 2003 was a ‘crafted 
code intended to ensure that evidence is admitted only when it is fair that it should 
be’.152  In sum, as Lord Philips clearly  recognised, what was at stake were rival 
conceptions of justice, or more specifically where the balance was to be struck 
between fairness to an accused and fairness to the public as part of the general 
conception of a fair trial. 
In dismissing the appeals, and rejecting the ECtHR’s view of the compatibility 
of the CJA 2003 with Art. 6 ECHR, Lord Philips giving the unanimous judgment of 
the court, based the decision on a number of factors which speak to the resolutely 
pluralist nature of the decision entailing the ‘constitutional essentials’ of the domestic 
legal system. They included the fact that  the common law had a longer pedigree of 
protecting defendant’s than the ECHR in terms of questions of hearsay, that 
parliament had deliberated extensively  on the issue and come up with the CJA as a 
fair compromise; that criminal procedure on the European continent by  reference to 
which the ECtHR developed its Art. 6 case law differed from that  of common law 
systems which offered greater protection to defendants; that the ECtHR’s case law on 
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this issue was not completely clear and lacked authoritative guidance from the Grand 
Chamber and that the court’s development of the case law in terms of the 
development of the ‘sole and decisive rule’ had not been properly  reasoned; that such 
a rule would create havoc in English criminal procedure and that the Al-Khawaja 
decision did not establish that it was necessary to apply a sole and decisive rule in 
English criminal procedure.153 Notwithstanding the failure by the UKSC to follow the 
ECtHR’s apparently clear ruling in Al-Khawaja, what the Court did not reject was the 
conception of a fair trial itself nor the formulation of the concept contained in Article 
6. Thus, Lord Philips concluded:154
‘I have decided that it would not be right for this court to hold that the [ECtHR’s case 
law] should have been applied rather than the provisions of the 2003 Act, interpreted 
in accordance with their natural meaning. I believe that these provisions strike the 
right balance between the imperative that a trial must be fair and the interests of 
victims in particular and society in general … In so concluding I have taken careful 
account of the Strasbourg jurisprudence.’ 
 
Normative conflicts in Europe: Constitutional, pluralist both or neither? 
What is clear from this snapshot of national judicial reactions to EU and 
ECHR law is that two distinct types of pluralism are at stake. With respect to the EU 
legal system, the nub of the conflict  relates to sovereignty:’ in terms of the autonomy 
and primacy of EU law and the ECJ’s judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz. On the other 
hand, ECHR pluralism relates to the particular expression of abstract values such as 
the right to a fair trial and how best to articulate and balance these values with other 
considerations and interests. Therefore, it is submitted that, contrary to the orthodox 
view of pluralism in Europe, that it is actually  pluralism with regard to the ECHR 
system which is constitutional whereas EU conflicts are of a more radical form and 
emphatically not constitutional. This is due to the fact that constitutionalism entails an 
elemental agreement which can be seen with respect to pluralism involving the ECHR 
but is lacking in respect of the EU. In order to substantiate this claim, a clear 
understanding of ‘constitutionalism’ is necessary, as well as an understanding of the 
domain of constitutional theory.
The domain of Constitutional Theory
 As noted above, constitutionalism has become an increasingly popular method 
of accounting for, and providing a normative context to, transnational legal orders and 
their interaction and conflict with national legal orders. Whereas the EU is perhaps the 
‘locus classicus’ of non-state constitutionalism, the notion has spread far and wide to 
cover various normative orders, legal systems and regulatory regimes up to and 
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include the United Nations and its system.155 Thus, the concept of constitutionalism is 
enjoying a particularly  fruitful period even if it’s domestic variant could be said to be 
in decline.156 
 The adoption or importation of the constitutional ideal beyond the state is not 
one that is free from controversy.157  Many have argued on various lines that the 
language of constitutionalism, in the absence of other aspects of the constitutional 
idea such as political community, legitimacy etc. mean that the notion does not make 
sense beyond the state container.158  Others have argued that this expansion has 
resulted in a debasing of the conceptual currency of constitutionalism such that it 
means all things to all people and its way of accounting for or describing a particular 
normative configuration has been lost.159 IT is not my intention to engage with these 
debates here. Rather, for the purposes of the preceding discussion, it is worth 
examining what constitutionalism can mean if it does indeed have relevance beyond 
its statist setting with respect to the conflicts between national legal systems and the 
EU and ECHR systems; in normative conflicts in contemporary Europe, what is the 
domain of constitutional theory?
Notwithstanding divergences and disagreements about the particulars of 
constitutionalism, modern constitutional theory is framed by the twin pillars of what 
de Sieyès called the pouvoir constituant and the pouvoir constitué.160  Thus, the 
various understandings of constitutionalism in terms of fundamental law, 
constitutional rights etc. all implicitly or explicitly entail or presuppose the twin 
concepts of legitimate origins and established order. 
It is no exaggeration to claim, however, that the vast majority of constitutional 
theorizing in recent years, and particularly the types of theories which have dominated 
constitutional pluralist discourses in Europe, dwell almost exclusively on the nature, 
significance and meaning of the pouvoir constitué, that is the order which is 
constituted by the constituting power, and less about the form or nature of the 
constituting power.161 Contemporary  constitutionalism is dominated by theorizing the 
dimensions of the pouvoir constitué by adopting meta-ethical approaches to the 
establishment of constitutional values such as the ‘veil of ignorance’ or an 
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‘overlapping consensus’; 162  a conception of law as integrity which coheres with 
higher order constitutional values of equality, 163 constitutional provisions, particularly 
rights provisions, as ‘incompletely theorized agreements’ requiring further definition 
and interpretation164 or in terms of models of balancing between conceptions of the 
right and the good. 165
What contemporary constitutional theory is not about,166 it is argued, is the 
meta-question of the limits of those who engage in the process of deliberation, 
adjudication etc.; that is the identification of those who get to decide who decides; 
who is and is not legitimately part of the political community which will then step 
behind the veil of ignorance, get at seat at the discussion table or become a signatory 
or ‘founding father’. These questions of constituent power are presupposed rather 
than addressed by contemporary constitutional theory. 
Moreover, such questions of inclusion and exclusion cannot be determined by 
the constituted order as it  leads to an infinite regress. This is because from the internal 
viewpoint of the constituted order, the constituent power or the constitutive act which 
founds constitutional order is, itself, unconstitutional. This paradox was articulated 
perhaps most clearly by Hannah Arendt in her study  of the first two modern 
revolutions finding that:167
‘… those who get together to constitute a new government are themselves 
unconstitutional, that is, they have no authority  to do what they have set out  to 
achieve. The vicious circle in legislating is present  not in ordinary lawmaking, but in 
laying down the fundamental law, the law of the land or the constitution, which from 
then on, is supposed to incarnate the ‘higher law’ from which all laws ultimately 
derive their authorship.’
This ‘vicious circle’ is also present in normative constitutional theory, 
particularly in the work of Hans Kelsen, where the constitution qua constituted order 
cannot internalize the act of its own constitution. Kelsen’s solution to plug the infinite 
regress was to postulate the basic norm presupposed in relation to the normative 
order.168 Thus, constitutionalism’s solution to the unauthorized origins of constituted 
power then is to describe this situation ex post such that ‘an act of constituent power 
gives rise to a legal order only retroactively – that is when it is viewed as an act  of 
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constituted power’.169  In the founding of constitutional order, the constituted power 
necessarily ‘excludes that a We says “we”’.170 
In post-state constitutionalism, this problem of the infinite regress and 
‘formless forming’171 of constitutional order takes the form of with what Prandini has 
called the ‘problem of the polity’.172  Like the problem of constituent power, this 
problem of the polity  is ‘connected with the arbitrariness of power’,173  which 
constitutional theory presupposes rather than establishes or justifies.174 The arbitrary 
process of inclusion and exclusion which affects domestic constitutionalism translates 
into an arbitrary privileging of one of the two levels involved in the conflict; national 
and supranational. 
Thus, constitutionalism lacks the resources to engage with the problem of the 
polity, as it is an expression of constitutionalism’s inherent paradox; the fact that 
constituted order cannot account for its own constitution. It lacks the resources to 
resolve this question beyond an abstract reference to an ex post naming of the 
constituent power as such. Rather, the question of the origins of constituent power is 
something extra constitutional and beyond the bounds of constitutional theory. What 
all this means is that  constitutionalism cannot act a device for arbitrating between 
rival claims to ultimate authority, cannot favour the postulating of one Grundnorm 
over another. All it  can do is describe the situation from the ex post constituted 
power’s viewpoint which is ipso facto tendentious.175 
If, the functions and perhaps more importantly, limitations of constitutionalism 
and constitutional theory are as I have outlined then this clearly has important 
implications for pluralist discourse in conflicting normative orders in Europe. As the 
Lisbon judgment clearly  illustrates, the conflicts between EU law and national law 
relate to disputes about Kompetenz-Kompetenz; that is the question of ultimate 
interpretative authority. This is simultaneously  claimed by the ECJ as well as national 
courts; rival supremacies of their respective orders. 
As such, the dispute is not one susceptible to constitutional compromise 
because it is, by  its nature, zero-sum. The notion of ultimate authority entails non-
heteronomy and rival claims to this status are incommensurate. These conflicts and 
therefore EU constitutional pluralism lack the elemental agreement presupposed by 
contemporary  constitutional theory precisely because the foundation of agreement, 
the ultimate legal authority, is disputed. This is the essence of pluralist conceptions of 
EU law as articulated by MacCormick at the outset in his account of radical pluralism. 
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It is a incorrigible fact that legal systems can only look to their own originating or 
constitutive rules as authoritative, that is as the ultimate resource and guide for 
normative conflict.176
As such, then, pace the metaconstitutionalist, EU legal conflicts are precisely 
about a ‘clash of absolutes that necessarily leads either the adoption of ECS or 
NCS’177 which cannot be resolved pursuant to an overarching ‘metaconstitution’. To 
postulate a ‘metaconstitutional’ frame to manage which rival claims based on 
principles of constitutionalism beyond the state, incompletely theorized agreements or 
an ‘overlapping consensus’ is simply  to beg the question, given that there is no 
starting point; no common ground, on the question of ultimate authority  which could 
found that basis of such a metaconstitution. 
 Where a metaconstitution can have a role in normative conflicts is where legal 
systems share the same values and diverge as to their precise meaning and 
interpretation. This is the case with ECHR conflicts, it  is submitted, which are not 
about the ultimate rule of recognition, or ‘top rule’ per se but rather relate to differing 
interpretations of common values. ECHR conflicts such as that in Horncastle are not 
questions of sovereignty or Kompetenz-Kompetenz, but rather the interpretation and 
expression of common values which form the foundation of an ECHR 
constitutionalism in terms of a thick agreement on the rights contained in the 
Convention by the legal systems of its signatory  states. What the ECHR pluralism 
entails, then, is the Neumann has called the ‘suprapositive’178 values of human rights 
norms establishing a putative European metaconstitutionalism. It its these 
suprapositive values which provide the basis of constitutional agreement whether 
expressed in terms of an overlapping consensus, an incompletely theorised agreement 
or the principles of political morality which underpin the national and ECHR legal 
systems. Similar to MacCormick’s conception of pluralism under international law, 
then, ECHR constitutional pluralism posits the hierarchy of the suprapositive values 
embedded in the ECHR itself which adjudicate and regulate the relationship between 
the two legal orders. The two legal systems, then, are in a heterarchical relationship 
with respect to each other.179 The values of the overarching metaconstitution of the 
ECHR opens up  a space for dialogue between national courts and the ECtHR in cases 
of conflict, as co-interpreters of the values, working together to ensure the protection 
and preservation of these values in their legal systems. In this way, Lord Philips’ 
concluding gambit  to the ECtHR in the Horncastle decision, is a metaconstitutionalist 
move par excellence, where he stated that “I hope that in due course the Strasbourg 
court may also take account of the reasons that have led me not to apply the [ECHR’s 
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test] in this case”.180  Thus, the space is opening up for dialogue with respect  to the 
meanings and interpretations of the suprapositive values of the ECHR 
metaconstitution where
the courts work with each other to ensure the protection of the right to a fair trial but 
showing deference and accommodation where national considerations must be taken 
into account.181 
Resetting the terms of the debate: An alternative Tale of Two Pluralisms.
 Thus, contrary to the orthodox position in the literature on legal pluralism in 
Europe, ECHR pluralism is genuinely  constitutional pluralist, whereas conflicts 
between EU and national law are not, they relate more to the are more genuinely 
pluralist in the sense of MacCormick’s ‘radical’182 or Krisch’s ‘systemic’183 pluralism. 
The contours of a dialogic metaconstitutional frame, as elaborated in Kumm’s 
constitutionalism beyond the state, Maduro’s contrapuntal law or Sabel and 
Gerstenberg’s co-ordinate constitutionalism are therefore more appropriate in respect 
of the ECHR/national law relationship than that of national law and EU law. This has 
already been considered at length and I have nothing to add to it here. Rather, the 
form of pluralism between EU law and national law merits closer attention. 
The challenge for an account of pluralism beyond the constitutional mould in 
the relationship between EU law and national law is to account for the viscosity of EU 
and national law in the absence of an overarching normative framework and which 
accounts for the specificity  of EU law, and in particular its deep  penetration in 
national legal orders which is not shared by other non-state orders.184 That is, what is 
the nature of the relationship between national law and EU law if it is not 
constitutional, and if national courts insist upon the ultimate authority of their 
constitutions, with simultaneous claims from the ECJ?
 As noted above, MacCormick first  postulated legal pluralism in Europe in 
terms of radical pluralism, where legal systems interacted in an unprincipled way. In 
developing his own account of pluralism in postnational law, Krisch survey’s the 
notion of systemic pluralist  in legal theory finding that it occupies a space between a 
reactionary dualism of traditional public international law and the ‘thick’ bonds of 
26
180 Horncastle, para. 108, emphasis added.
181 Moreover,  the nature of ECHR constitutional pluralism, it is submitted, does not entail the margin of 
appreciation, so beloved of legal pluralists everywhere. This is because the margin of appreciation is an 
intra-systemic phenomenon whereas pluralism is necessarily inter-systemic. Since the inception of the 
doctrine, the ECHR has argued that the margin of appreciation is part of the Convention system itself, 
allowing deference to the signatory states in the implementation of the rights contained in the 
convention. Pluralism, by contrast, as MacCormick clearly shows, is inter-system, that is between 
systems rather than within one system. It relates to the contestation of the interpretation itself,  not 
whether interpretation is unilaterally deferred by the ECHR. In this regard, pluralism relates to the 
assertion of one’s interpretative authority outwith the system as opposed to within the system. Legal 
pluralism, and in particular pluralist conflicts,  relate to regime collision, where rival sites claim that 
their interpretation of common values is more appropriate or superior in defiance of the claims of the 
other site.
182 MacCormick, Sovereignty now.
183 Krisch, Case for Pluralism.
184 Including, it must be added, the metaconstitutional ECHR.
27
post-state constitutionalism which can be useful in order to establish the nature of 
pluralism in EU legal conflicts.185 
Perhaps the most radical from of legal pluralism identified by Krisch are the 
sociological approach of Teubner and Fischer-Lesacano186 where pluralism is simply 
the necessary result of extreme societal differentiation, which has been applied 
specifically in the EU context by  Maher.187  This is the sociological equivalent of 
MacCormick’s ‘radical pluralism’ rendered even more radical by the opening up of a 
plurality  of vistas beyond the pluralisms of international normative orders.188 
However, following Koskenniemi, Krisch finds that such pluralism ‘ceases to pose 
demands on the world.’189  Moreover, in the EU context in particular, this ‘radical’ 
radical pluralism fails to account for the particularity of EU law vis-à-vis other post-
state legal orders and in particular the depth of penetration of the norms of EU law in 
national legal and constitutional practices. Krisch also looks at the normative virtues 
of pluralism in terms of ‘checks and balances’ between legal systems which is close to 
Sabel and Gerstenberg’s co-ordinate constitutionalism and Maduro’s contrapunctual 
law. However, this harks back to a form of constitutionalism which cannot overcome 
the problem of the polity. Even if we bracket the thicker elements of Maduro’s 
contrapuntal law (particularly its constitutional-style incompletely theorised 
agreements) and accept the normative thrust of mutual monitoring implicit in the 
checks and balances conception of the nature of the interaction between the orders, 
there is a sense in which this presupposes an overarching (constitutionalist) frame 
within which such checks and balances take place. It is no coincidence that  checks 
and balances are the lynchpin of separation of powers constitutional and federal 
theories, however it  is precisely this overarching frame which is explicitly  repudiated 
in the polity-centred Kompetenz-Kompetenz claims of national constitutional courts as 
illustrated in the BVG’s Lisbon judgment. 
Another alternative way of managing pluralism between the EU and national 
legal orders which appears in Krisch’s survey, is Weiler’s looser form of pluralism 
predicated on a ‘constitutional tolerance’,190  where the systems are ‘invited’ rather 
than ‘told’ to obey the constitutional orders or principles in order to avoid ‘mutually 
assured destruction’191. However, from the viewpoint  of EU legal conflicts, it  is 
submitted that this is also problematic. First of all, from an empirical viewpoint, it 
does not  seem that the invitation to obey is reconcilable with the aggressive assertion 
of autonomy by  national courts in cases of conflict which was evidenced in the 
BVG’s Lisbon judgment. The assertion of national constitutional primacy seems more 
defensive and unilateral than consensual, which is a hallmark of the ideal of 
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constitutional tolerance.192 Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the principle of 
constitutional tolerance does tend towards a sort of ‘constitutional’ monism in the 
form of a higher, if not quite norm, then principle or idea which both undermines its 
genuinely pluralist  credentials. Furthermore, constitutional tolerance, fails to 
distinguish the peculiarities of the EU legal order from other post-state normative 
orders which states are ‘invited’ to obey but frequently and often do not. 
Finally, Krisch’s own suggestion of a ‘complex and fluid’ postnational order’ 
constitutionally  subject to readjustment and challenge’193  faces a similar twofold 
challenge.194  Firstly, it  fails to capture the specificity of the EU as a form of 
postnational law and political organisation, but again, perhaps more importantly it 
seems to stretch the notion of ‘order’ to breaking point. 195  It seems that such 
pluralism is a polite form of chaos, and, from a juristic point  of view, a blatant 
violation of the rule of law with knock-on effects on the legitimacy of the judiciary 
and their interpretation and application of post-national norms. It  tends towards an 
explicit  endorsement of ‘billiard ball’ politics with little in the way of normative 
guidance as to how and when post-national norms do or should apply  in national 
jurisdictions nor does it account for the viscosity between EU and national law.196 
This therefore somewhat undermines the claim that pluralism is something other than 
traditional international law dualism.
 It may be that our normative vocabulary is lacking with respect to the nature 
of the relationship and conflicts between national law and EU law; resulting in a 
recourse to the hackneyed (and meaningless) sui generis label. 
I think, perhaps, however that constitutionalism, in its hierarchical form may 
still be the best  way to conceptualise the relationship  between EU and national law, 
and that, perhaps, many constitutional pluralists might tacitly  agree. This does not 
mean burying one’s head in the sand when the German Constitutional Court fires its 
next ‘shot over the bow’,197 but  rather accepting such recalcitrance and conflict as part 
and parcel of any hierarchical constitutional order. This is similar to Baquero-Cruz’s 
characterisation of EU conflicts in terms of ‘institutional disobedience’198, drawing on 
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the Rawlsian tradition of civil disobedience in terms of ‘a public, nonviolent, 
conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing 
about a change in the law or policies of government’.199  There are a number of 
demands on institutional disobedience, particularly as a last resort in the framework of 
otherwise generally just  and well-functioning systems. As such institutional 
disobedience can actually have positive effects on the hierarchical constitutional 
systems more generally as a ‘stabilising device’ or ‘escape valve’200 for the system as 
a whole. An example of the positive externalities of institutional disobedience is the 
development of a fundamental rights case law by  the ECJ where the German courts 
threatened institutional disobedience if EU law violated the provisions of the German 
Bill of Rights. This had a positive effect of the EU’s (hierarchical) constitutional order 
and ultimately culminated in the drafting of Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU.201 Similarly, the threatened institutional disobedience by  the German courts again 
in Maastricht and Lisbon can be said to have had a positive effect on the ECJ’s 
controlling of the legislative competences of the EU institutions, both with respect to 
the EU’s lack of competence to accede to the ECHR202 and leading to the first case of 
an EU law being struck down by the ECJ on grounds of exceeding their competences 
under the treaty.203 
However, it is important to distinguish the conditions surrounding institutional 
disobedience from crystallising into yet another set of principles or criteria for 
resolving conflicts between EU and national law, which invariably  take on 
hierarchical ‘metaconstitutional’ tendencies.204  Civil disobedience is just that, 
disobedience; a conscious decision to defy the law and as such it cannot by definition 
be governed by  the law. It is a fact of life that not  everybody obeys the law all the 
time, and this applies as much to institutions as to individuals. In this regard, we 
should embrace the occasional recalcitrance and rebellion as part of any hierarchical 
and constitutional relationship and as a healthy part of the political and constitutional 
landscape in Europe. 
Conclusion
 The proliferation of normative orders coming into conflict is an increasingly 
common part of our legal universe. The era of a simplistic dualism between 
international and national or constitutional law, where the normative orders were 
contained in hermetically sealed sovereignty states is passing. The lid on that 
Cormac'Mac'Amhlaigh,'Edinburgh'Law'School
29
199  John Rawls,  A Theory of Justice, reproduced in Hugo A Bedau (ed), Civil Disobedience in Focus 
(London and New York, Routledge, 1991) 104. For the definition, Rawls relies on Hugo A Bedau, ‘On 
Civil Disobedience’ (1961) Journal of Philosophy, 1961, 653.
200 Baquero Cruz, An Area of Darkness, 16.
201 O. J. C 83 30.03.2010.
202 Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR I-1759.
203 Case C-376/98, Germany v. Council [2000] ECR I-8419. See also, Baquero-Cruz, Legacy, p. 404.
204  For example both Kumm and, particularly Sabel and Gerstenberg endorse the Solange case law of 
the BVG as part of their characterization of the normative principles underpinning the relationship 
between national and EU legal systems. However, they do so by adopting a metaconstitutional 
approach which is repudiated here. Disappointingly, Baquero Cruz himself ultimately opts for a similar 
type of ‘metaconstitutional’ model of institutional disobedience along the lines of Kumm. See Baquero-
Cruz, Area of Darkness, pp. 17-20.
30
#
Pandora’s box has well and truly  been lifted, not least  in Europe which is 
experiencing perhaps the most intense form of pluralism of normative orders. The EU 
and ECHR in particular, challenge the orthodox Westphalian picture on legal systems 
and their interaction. The constitutional claims made by these sites introduce a 
vertical competition for the symbolic prize of constitutionalism as ultimate authority; 
something which had been hitherto fought purely vertically between the rival 
constitutional systems of sovereign states. It is natural for lawyers to be attracted to 
disruptions in the working order of these systems, particularly when they come into 
conflict, and attempt to provide a principled normative solution to social conflict. 
Indeed, this is what law does.
 Thus, the development of pluralism and subsequently constitutional pluralism 
as a way of managing and resolving conflicts between national and post-state legal 
orders is both understandable and necessary. However, as this paper has attempted to 
demonstrate, the way in which constitutionalism has been employed in these conflicts 
specifically is erroneous. It is the lesser analysed relationship  between national law 
and the ECHR which is truly  constitutional pluralist given that it entails a common 
point of reference, a constitutive agreement on the suprapositive values which inform 
the ECHR itself. This is constitutionalism in its classic form and disagreements 
emerged as to the nature and requirements of, rather than the existence and 
articulation of the values themselves. With regard to the EU, the conflicts are less 
constitutional and may be more pluralist. The existential conflicts regarding ultimate 
authority which form the basis of EU pluralism are not something which is amenable 
to constitutional resolution. They  reflect the stuff of sovereignty; the unauthorised 
origins of power and as such cannot be managed by an ex post constituted power, 
whether through metaconstitutional principles or otherwise. 
 The concerns regarding pluralism and particularly the rule of law and the role 
of courts in settling systemic conflicts is warranted and recent reactions and 
vilifications of courts, particularly supranational courts,205  is a reminder that Courts 
are as vulnerable as any branch of government to the vicissitudes of public opinion. 
That courts uphold the rule of law is central to their legitimacy and the drive to 
constitutionalise normative conflicts is part of this ideal. With regard to the ECHR, 
courts can claim that they  are upholding the values of the ECHR while disagreeing 
with the ECHR’s interpretation thereof. With regard to EU normative conflicts on the 
other hand, the upholding of the rule of law entails upholding the rule of EU law. This 
will not always be perfect nor possible but where institutional disobedience is 
warranted, the resulting compromise should be viewed for what it is; as the normal 
development and evolution of any (hierarchical) constitutional system. 
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